We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations. A case-by-case inquiry into the extent to which each individual applicant has been affected, either directly or indirectly, by racial discrimination, would seem to be, as a practical matter, virtually impossible, despite the fact that there are excellent reasons for concluding that such effects generally exist. 1138, 41 L.Ed. I, § 2. ), has emphasized the existence of previous discrimination as a predicate for the imposition of a preferential remedy. (private action under the Financial Assistance Act). 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. To be sure, some of these may be "distinguished" on the ground that victimization was directly present. Professor Bickel noted the self-contradiction of that view: "The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstit tional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. 1774 (1943). The fatal flaw in petitioner's preferential program is its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Both that Act and Title VI are broadly phrased in terms of personal rights ("no person shall be denied . Id., at 13333. Humphrey and. Following the interviews, each candidate was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by his interviewers and four other members of the admissions committee. The earliest exemplifications, too well known for repeating the history here, arose in the Court's refusal to render advisory opinions and in applications of the related jurisdictional policy drawn from the case and controversy limitation. 1093 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976), we approved a retroactive award of seniority to a class of Negro truckdrivers who had been the victims of discrimination—not just by society at large, but by the respondent in that case. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S.Ct. (Representative Celler and Senators Humphrey and Kuchel were the House and Senate floor managers for the entire Civil Rights Act, and Senator Pastore was the majority Senate floor manager for Title VI.). § 2000b et seq., and Title IV, 42 U.S.C. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966). As Mr. Justice Harlan noted in dissent, however, the Civil War Amendmen § and Civil Rights Acts did not make the Negroes the "special favorite" of the laws but instead "sought to accomplish in reference to that race . The section-by-section analysis of the 1972 amendments to Title VII undertaken by the Conference Committee Report on H.R. Although slavery would have disappeared, the States would retain the power "to interfere with the full enjoyment of the blessings of freedom; to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race; and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens . 163 U.S., at 559, 16 S.Ct., at 1146. If it is, any State, including California, is free to adopt it in preference to a less acceptable alternative, just as it is generally free, as far as the Constitution is concerned, to abjure granting any racial preferences in its admissions program. The judiciary, in contrast, is ill-equipped and poorly trained for this. You may also find answers to common questions, information about how to protect your information, and updates for the UC community as they're available. None of these sources lends support to the proposition that Congress intended to bar all race-conscious efforts to extend the benefits of federally financed programs to minorities who have been historically excluded from the full benefits of American life. The parallel between the prohibitions of Title VI and those of the Constitution was clearest with respect to the immediate goal of the Act—an end to federal funding of "separate but equal" facilities. . 1974) (hereinafter Woodward). . Uprooted from his homeland and thrust into bondage for forced labor, the slave was deprived of all legal rights. Respondent, echoing the courts below, labels it a racial quota.26, This semantic distinction is beside the point: The special admissions program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background. Under these circumstances, the enactment of the 10% "set-aside" for minority enterprises reflects a congressional judgment that the remedial use of race is permissible under Title VI. Secondly, Lau clearly requires that institutions receiving federal funds be accorded considerable latitude in voluntarily undertaking race-conscious action designed to remedy the exclusion of significant numbers of minorities from the benefits of federally funded programs. White disadvantaged students were never considered under the special program, and the University acknowledges that its goal in devising the program was to increase minority enrollment. Instead, to justify such a classification an important and articulated purpose for its use must be shown. This would be a remarkable reading of a statute designed to eliminate constitutional violations, especially in light of judicial decisions holding that under certain circumstances the remedial use of racial criteria is not only permissible but is constitutionally required to eradicate constitutional violations. Id., at 289. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. 664 (1880) (Celtic Irishmen) (dictum); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. That is the area of governmental conduct. . See also Austin Independent School Dist. 664 (1880); Korematsu v. United States, supra, 323 U.S., at 223, 65 S.Ct., at 197; Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 663, 68 S.Ct. As Professor John Hope Franklin has observed Americans "proudly accepted the challenge and responsibility of their new political freedom by establishing the machinery and safeguards that insured the continued enslavement of blacks." See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. Brief for Petitioner 4 n. 5. In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant, however, the courts below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin. Nor would the state interest in genuine diversity be served by expanding petitioner's two-track system into a multitrack program with a prescribed number of seats set aside for each identifiable category of applicants. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. W. Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 69 (1911). What is most significant about the congressional consideration of the measure is that although the use of a racial quota or "set-aside" by a recipient of federal funds would constitute a direct violation of Title VI if that statute were read to prohibit race-conscious action, no mention was made during the debates in either the House or the Senate of even the possibility that the quota provisions for minority contractors might in any way conflict with or modify Title VI. See also E. Fenton, Immigrants and Unions: A Case Study 561-562 (1975). 996, 51 L.Ed. Consequently, it is most significant that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which provides much of the federal assistance to institutions of higher education, has adopted regulations requiring affirmative measures designed to enable racial minorities which have been previously discriminated against by a federally funded institution or program to overcome the effects of such actions and authorizing the voluntary undertaking of affirmative-action programs by federally funded institutions that have not been guilty of prior discrimination in order to overcome the effects of conditions which have adversely affected the degree of participation by persons of a particular race. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). 851, 94 L.Ed. 1774 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional, distinction between, for example, adding a set number of points to the admissions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants as an expression of the preference with the expectation that this will result in the admission of an approximately determined number of qualified minority applicants and setting a fixed number of places for such applicants as was done here.63. Later interpretation and clarification of the Constitution to permit remedial use of race would then not dislodge Title VI's prohibition of race-conscious action. Annual Dean’s Report. Neither is there a "ceiling," since an unlimited number could be admitted through the general admissions process. ); the Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. Id., at 24-25, 3 S.Ct., at 31. 1271, 1278-1279, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965). 1520 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., at 5864 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6561 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id., at 7055 (remarks of Sen. Pastore). Sol. 357 F.2d, at 454. 2072 (1945), to hold that it barred state action to remedy the effects of that discrimination. reviews judgments, not statements in opinions." But the consistent use of the pronoun throughout the paragraph to refer to Bakke makes such a reading entirely unpersuasive, as does the failure of the trial court to suggest that it was issuing relief to applicants who were not parties to the suit. In short, nothing in the legislative history justifies the conclusion that the broad language of § 601 should not be given its natural meaning. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296, 96 S.Ct. If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique quality might give him an edge over both A and B. 873 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, 379 U.S., at 191-192, 85 S.Ct., at 287-289; Loving v. Virginia, supra, 388 U.S., at 11-12, 87 S.Ct., at 1823-1824; Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375-376, 87 S.Ct. 803, 808, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). Representative Lindsay, also a member of the Judiciary Committee, candidly acknowledged, in the course of explaining why Title VI was necessary, that it did not create any new standard of equal treatment beyond that contained in the Constitution: "Both the Federal Government and the States are under constitutional mandates not to discriminate. Thus, the judgment below must be reversed in that it prohibits race from being used as a factor in university admissions. The school desegregation cases are inapposite. 940 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. . It would assure Negroes the benefits now accorded only white students in programs of high[er] education financed by Federal funds. Senator Humphrey set the theme in his speech presenting Title VI to the Senate: "Large sums of money are contributed by the United States each year for the construction, operation, and maintenance of segregated schools. and Supp. 1287, 28 L.Ed.2d 582 (1971); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. But that awareness [of the necessity of including more than a token number of black students] does not mean that the Committee sets a minimum number of blacks or of people from west of the Mississippi who are to be admitted. Racial factors have been given consideration in the school desegregation cases, in the employment cases, in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. But Bakke did not seek to cut off the University's federal funding; he sought admission to medical school. Also, the mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next, a critical feature of its coherent interpretation. His application had come late in the year, and no applicants in the general admissions process with scores below 470 were accepted after Bakke's application was completed. Although the statute contains an exemption from this requirement "to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise," this escape clause was provided only to deal with the possibility that certain areas of the country might not contain sufficient qualified "minority business enterprises" to permit compliance with the quota provisions of the legislation.23, The legislative history of this race-conscious legislation reveals that it represents a deliberate attempt to deal with the excessive rate of unemployment among minority citizens and to encourage the development of viable minority controlled enterprises.24 It was believed that such a "set-aside" was required in order to enable minorities, still "new on the scene" and "relatively small," to compete with larger and more established companies which would always be successful in underbidding minority enterprises. Section 602 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 1483, 1489, 89 L.Ed. See remarks of Senator Humphrey (id., at 5253, 6553); Senator Ribicoff (id., at 7057, 13333); Senator Pastore (id., at 7057); Senator Javits (id., at 5606-5607, 6050).14 Indeed, there was a strong emphasis throughout Congress' consideration of Title VI on providing the Executive Branch with considerable flexibility in interpreting and applying the prohibition against racial discrimination. . We see it in the Indian programs. 11246 did not conflict with Title VII: "It is not correct to say that Title VII prohibits employers from making race or national origin a factor for consideration at any stage in the process of obtaining employees. It would prevent abuse of food distribution programs whereby Negroes have been known to be denied food surplus supplies when white persons were given such food. Other Senators expressed similar views.22. In neither, however, was there any showing that the school board planned extensive pupil transportation that might threaten liberty or privacy interests. . Hence, the purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School perceived as victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility or whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered. " Woodward 68. Ibid. 328-355. Racial classifications call for strict judicial scrutiny. Despite the objection to the special treatment the bill would provide for Negroes, it was passed by Congress. of Ed. );39 id., at 167, 97 S.Ct., at 1010 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ. 24-25 (1963), U.S.Code Cong. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Cf. 193, 89 L.Ed. 848, 94 L.Ed. J. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom 4th ed. SGPA OGPA Verbal Quantitative Science. The Court further concluded that Negroes were not intended to be included as citizens under the Constitution but were "regarded as beings of an inferior order . 699, 729-731 (1971). 555, 562-563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-241, 96 S.Ct. . (1976 ed.)). 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). In short, an admissions program operated in this way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight. Vote online for your favorite contestants during UC’s 6th annual Grad Slam contest. 158, 159, 62 L.Ed. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared in another connection, "[j]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice." EMERGENCY: 9-1-1. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492], we have no occasion here to 'reach the constitutional question whether Congress has the power to make municipalities liable for acts of its officers that violate the civil rights of individuals.' § 2000d et seq., provides for a private cause of action. The full committee then reviewed the file and scores of each applicant and made offers of admission on a "rolling" basis.3 The chairman was responsible for placing names on the waiting list. . In the wake of Plessy, many States expanded their Jim Crow laws, which had up until that time been limited primarily to passenger trains and schools. The following table compares Bakke's science grade point average, overall grade point average, and MCAT scores with the average scores of regular admittees and of special admittees in both 1973 and 1974. 316, 407, 4 L.Ed. A separate committee, a majority of whom were members of minority groups, operated the special admissions program. 1278, 1299-1300, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (applying Katzenbach test to state action intended to remove discrimination in educational opportunity). The Court began by interpreting the Civil War Amendments in a manner that sharply curtailed their substantive protections. Executive, judicial, and congressional action subsequent to the passage of Title VII conclusively established that the Title did not bar the remedial use of race. "The purpose of title VI is to make sure that funds of the United States are not used to support racial discrimination. 2, pp. Storandt expressed sympathy for Bakke's position and offered advice on litigation strategy. §§ 2000b-2 and 2000c-8. The Court's ultimate blow to the Civil War Amendments and to the equality of Negroes came in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. . U-M provides outstanding undergraduate, graduate and professional education, serving the local, regional, national and … § 2000d et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court emphasized that "the Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group." ". Against this background, claims that law must be "color-blind" or that the datum of race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as description of reality. The University of California Police Department (UCPD) seeks to continually improve the accessibility of its information and services to all persons. To b oaden the opportunities for participation in biomedical research of ethnic minority faculty, students, and investigators by providing support for biomedical research programs at eligible institutions.". . To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803, 805-806, 93 S.Ct. 365 U.S. [167], at 191 [81 S.Ct. There are no rival groups which can claim that they, too, are entitled to preferential treatment. The belief that diversity adds an essential ingredient to the educational process has long been a tenet of Harvard College admissions. See Census, supra, n. 49, Sources and Structure of Family Income, pp. In short, there is no empirical data to demonstrate that any one race is more selflessly socially oriented or by contrast that another is more selfishly acquisitive." 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977), indicates a willingness to approve racial classifications designed to benefit certain minorities, without denominating the classifications as "suspect." Fabian Rivera-Chávez is working to communicate the safety and life-saving importance of COVID-19 vaccination in underserved communities. Dr. Lowrey found Bakke "rather limited in his approach" to the problems of the medical profession and found disturbing Bakke's "very definite opinions which were based more on his personal viewpoints than upon a study of the total problem." 873 (1954), that relegated minorities to inferior educational institutions,52 and that denied them intercourse in the mainstream of professional life necessary to advancement. I need not go that far, for despite its two-track aspect, the Davis program, for me, is within constitutional bounds, though perhaps barely so. Quoting from our earlier decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. There is a mistaken belief that Congress is legislating in these areas in this bill. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular background—whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged—may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity.49. The Senate bill, however, contained no such restriction upon HEW's authority to impose race-conscious remedies and the Conference Committee, upon the urging of the Secretary of HEW, deleted the House provision from the bill.21 More significant for present purposes, however, is the fact that even the proponents of imposing limitations upon HEW's implementation of Title VI did not challenge the right of federally funded educational institutions voluntarily to extend preferences to racial minorities. to Brief for Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as Amici Curiae 2-3. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S., at 634, 70 S.Ct., at 850, the Court made a similar point with specific reference to legal education: "The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. In addition, there is simply no evidence that the Davis program discriminates intentionally or unintentionally against any minority group which it purports to benefit. Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion recognized the bankruptcy of the Court's reasoning. Representative MacGregor addressed directly the problem of preferential treatment: "Your mail and mine, your contacts and mine with our constituents, indicates a great degree of misunderstanding about this bill. I participate fully, of course, in the opinion, ante, p. 324, that bears the names of my Brothers BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and myself. See, e. g., H.R.Rep. Section 602, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. 793, 11 L.Ed.2d 659 (1964)]. This is clearly so wherever Federal funds go to a State agency which engages in racial discrimination. Califano v. Webster, supra, 430 U.S., at 317, 97 S.Ct., at 1194; Kahn v. Shevin, supra. 281-287. Properly construed, therefore, our prior cases unequivocally show that a state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might otherwise have and if there is reason to believe that the disparate impact is itself the product of past discrimination, whether its own or that of society at large. 6047 (1964) (remarks of Sen Pastore). 303 U.S., at 229, 58 S.Ct., at 602. The court refused to order Bakke's admission, however, holding that he had failed to carry his burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for the existence of the special program. Fifteen or twenty years ago, however, diversity meant students from California, New York, and Massachusetts; city dwellers and farm boys; violinists, painters and football players; biologists, historians and classicists; potential stockbrokers, academics and politicians. does not depend upon the outcome of the equal protection analysis. 1764, 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973) (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ. Title III, 42 U.S.C. See, e. g., R. Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South 1820-1860, pp. . IPM can be used to manage all kinds of pests anywhere–in urban, agricultural, and wildland or natural areas. But this should not and must not mask the central meaning of today's opinions: Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in this area. As explained by Senator Humphrey, § 601 expresses a principle imbedded in the constitutional and moral understanding of the times. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297, 76 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 256 (1896). It would not make sense, for example, to have 10 or 20 students out of 1,100 whose homes are west of the Mississippi. The Court, in turn, rested its decision on Title VI. It would, in short, assure the existing right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Federal funds. However, even accepting Lau's implication that impact alone is in some contexts sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VI, contrary to our review that Title VI's definition of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's, this would not assist the respondent in the least. . That Negroes were deliberately excluded from public graduate and professional schools—and thereby denied the opportunity to become doctors, lawyers, engineers, and the like—is also well established. About one-fifth of the total number of special applicants were invited for interviews in 1973 and 1974.5 Following each interview, the special committee assigned each special applicant a benchmark score. Co., the Court held that "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against . The number of applicants who are deemed to be not "qualified" is comparatively small. 8 on Money 's list of “ Best Colleges for Transfer Students . 7065 (1964). 427, 41 L.Ed. I agree that such a program, where race or ethnic background is only one of many factors, is a program better formulated than Davis' two-track system. Because it was possible, however, that a decision on Title VI might obviate resort to constitutional interpretation, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-348, 56 S.Ct. See separate opinion of Mr. Justice WHITE, post, at 382-383, n. 2. 1064, 30 L.Ed. Each of these injuries was constitutionally cognizable as is respondent's here. Id., at 431, 91 S.Ct., at 853 (emphasis added). . It does not at all follow, however, that Congress anticipated new private actions under Title VI itself. But for the past 30 years the Committee on Admissions has never adopted this approach. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." An applicant of whatever race who has demonstrated his concern for disadvantaged minorities in the past and who declares that practice in such a community is his primary professional goal would be more likely to contribute to alleviation of the medical shortage than one who is chosen entirely on the basis of race and disadvantage. (4) There is ample evidence that Congress considered private causes of action to be consistent with, if not essential to, the legislative scheme. 1, United States Summary, Table 209. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). It may be argued that there is greater force to these views at the undergraduate level than in a medical school where the training is centered primarily on professional competency. 1023, 1025, 88 L.Ed. 873 (1954); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 96 S.Ct. In both years, applicants were admitted under the special program with grade point averages, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's.7. The court analogized Bakke's situation to that of a plaintiff under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. In that cause, the Fourteenth Amendment's "one pervading purpose" was displaced. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). An explanatory regulation explicitly states that the affirmative action which § 80.3(b)(6)(ii) contemplates includes the use of racial preferences: "Even though an applicant or recipient has never used discriminatory policies, the services and benefits of the program or activity it administers may not in fact be equally available to some racial or nationality groups.